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Abstract: Deconstruction has already happened on the Supreme Court.  Not only can no member of the 
Court really believe that "the law" (self-invented by the very Court it is supposed to govern!) can constrain 
the result in any individual case, but its members have also convinced themselves that they have no time to 
be concerned with dispensing justice to the parties. The justificatory legal language used in judicial 
opinions is not what our law teachers told us it was. The justificatory legal language is not provided to 
explain—much less constrain—the result in the case. Rather, it is a mode of couching the personal 
legislative preferences of unelected judges in the publicly venerated language of a judicial decree. 
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 [p113]** If law is indeterminate, must it be so? Joseph Singer says no. There is a 
possible legal system, he claims, in which law is completely determinate. Hence, he 
argues, our own legal system could be determinate as well. FN1 
 
 What is Professor Singer's example of a completely determinate legal system? It 
is:  Consider a legal system with the rule "the plaintiff always loses."FN2 That, according 
to Professor Singer, spells total determinacy. Kenneth Kress considers Singer's sentence 
so irrefutable that he employs it as a throwaway line: 
Although complete determinacy is attainable in a legal system (Singer considers 
the rule: The plaintiff always loses), any completely determinate system  .... FN3 
This is one of those "although" throwaways that was a bit too hasty. 
 
 Professors Singer and Kress would have us believe that we can have a legal 
system where the outcome of any case is totally determinate, because each and every 
outcome is the same and known in advance—namely, the defendant wins and the plaintiff 
loses. The point is of extreme importance to these professors and to similar-minded 
doctrinalists. They must cite at least one hypothetical legal system that is clearly 
determinate, or else risk allowing the camel's nose of indeterminacy into their tent. 
 
 However, Professors Singer and Kress have failed to consider what coherent or 
even plausible meaning they can possibly give to the term "legal system" when the 
system in question contains the single rule "plaintiff always loses." I would contend that 
such a "system" is not and cannot possibly be a "legal system." 
 
 To show this, let us for the moment accept their "legal system" and consider its 
consequences. If the plaintiff always loses, in practice nobody is going to want to be a 
plaintiff. Thus, if you defraud me out of  [p114] $1,000 of my money, I would not want 
to be a plaintiff against you in court, because plaintiffs always lose. So instead I will buy 
a gun and threaten to shoot you until you return my money. Suppose you go to court to 
get a restraining order against me; no luck, because you will be a plaintiff and plaintiffs 
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always lose. Suppose instead that you persuade the state to prosecute me for threatening 
you with a gun. Too bad; the state is the plaintiff and so it loses also. 
 
 Now suppose that, emboldened by my successful physical assault against you, I 
decide to embark on a career of robbing banks. I hire accomplices, we shoot our way into 
banks, we take money; the state cannot prosecute any of us because plaintiffs always 
lose. Soon everyone goes into the assault and robbery business. The police shoot to kill 
because they have no incentive to arrest anyone; all court cases against arrested persons 
are losers because the defendants always win. The scenario can be extended, but the 
picture should be clear. In a word, it's anarchy. It is the entire absence of any law and 
order; indeed, it is the absence of anything that can be called a "legal system."  
 
 Professors Singer and Kress have created total anarchy. True, it is determinate in 
the sense that it is total anarchy. There is no doubt that redress in court is futile. But then, 
in such a situation of chaos, there would be no "courts." The term "court" will be archaic, 
because it is part of the conventional (though unnoticed) meaning of "courts" that at least 
on some occasions plaintiffs will win. 
 
 Thus the rule "the plaintiff always loses" is a far cry from a throwaway line that 
refutes the legal indeterminacy thesis. It is, instead, a shambles. 
 
 A similar attempt to refute indeterminacy in one bold stroke, this time by the use 
of a statistic, is the demonstration of a low rate of dissenting opinions in present-day 
judicial decisions. For example, two federal judges in their role as scholars have 
examined a sampling of appellate decisions in federal courts, and found that dissents 
were filed in less than four percent of the cases. FN4 They conclude that law is not so 
indeterminate after all. Professor Ken Kress restates their conclusion: law cannot be 
radically indeterminate in light of such certainty about the correct outcome.FN5 To drive 
the point home he adds the standard homily that academics focus too much on 
indeterminate cases in the classroom and in academic writing, and ignore the vast bulk of 
routine litigation. "Belief in indeterminacy," he writes, "results in part from a bad diet." 
FN6 
 
  [p115]Professor Kress does not understand legal indeterminacy; if he did, he 
would see that it is law's indeterminacy—not determinate law—that produces a low rate 
of dissent! Given the deconstructionist's view that law does not constrain a judge's ruling 
in any given case, there is little point in dissenting. A decision in any case is reached by 
the brute force of majority rule. The majority was not constrained by law to reach the 
decision it reached, as the minority well knows. Hence there is nothing to be gained by 
dissenting. 
 
 Not only is there nothing to be gained, but a dissent can be perceived as chipping 
away at the court's legitimacy. Would-be dissenting judges probably are subjected to 
collegial pressure to change their intended negative vote to a positive recorded vote, so 
that the opinion of the court will appear less controversial, more authoritative, more 
constrained by the law. This dynamic, I suggest, operates in all courts at all times and in 
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all places. A judge who dissents too often is looked upon as a maverick, a non-team 
player, a person who, for egotistic reasons, would erode the authority of the court by 
unnecessarily challenging its wisdom in dissenting opinions. 
 
 Since recognition that law is indeterminate exposes the futility of filing a dissent, 
the indeterminacy thesis would predict an eventual disappearance of judicial dissents. 
The statistical question at present is not  why a four percent dissenting rate is so low, but 
rather why it is so high! One possible answer has been suggested by Professor Robert 
Benson: some judges have simply fooled themselves into believing that law is 
determinate, and therefore they write dissents out of the mistaken belief that what they 
write could make a difference (perhaps to the Supreme Court, or to a future appellate 
court in a similar case). FN7 If Professor Benson is correct, we should see the four 
percent rate diminishing as judges shed their illusions as a result of their growing 
awareness of deconstruction scholarship. The decline in dissenting opinions may even 
accelerate because of an intellectual runaway effect. For the more that legal scholars talk 
about deconstruction, the more that many judges—feeling a threat to their public 
legitimacy—will attempt to produce the appearance of certainty. Judges may well join 
together to discourage dissents. 
 
 One might object that my thesis does not explain why there is so much dissent in 
the United States Supreme Court. The objection is in a sense ironic, for up to now the 
proponents of legal indeterminacy have cited the cleavages on the Supreme Court as 
proof of indeterminacy, whereas the doctrinalists have sought to explain the phenomenon 
by pointing out that only the most indeterminate cases get to the Supreme [p116] Court in 
the first place. I reject both of these arguments, and instead contend that the fact of 
indeterminacy predicts increasingly fewer dissents; consequently, I accept the burden of 
explanation. Since a full explanation, complete with citations to "authorities," would 
comprise an entire article, I bequeath this task to anyone who might want to take it 
up, and here simply outline my arguments. 
 
 The Supreme Court, I contend, is no longer a court that decides cases. It has 
become in the last fifty or so years a legislative body which uses a case simply as a 
serendipitous vehicle for enacting social legislation. This century has seen the 
emasculation of the Court's original jurisdiction and the virtual elimination of its 
appellate jurisdiction. Instead, the Court has become a certiorari Court. As a general 
proposition, the Court grants certiorari to cases that four justices out of nine believe are 
"important" in some sense or other (perhaps "interesting" might be a more descriptive 
word). One does not have to be a deconstructionist to accept the proposition that the 
vague certiorari standards do not constrain the Justices in deciding which cases they want 
to hear. FN8 
 
 Nevertheless, the Court spends much of its time arguing over which petitions 
should be granted certiorari. Since there are so many petitions, and so few can be granted, 
the general practice has evolved that justice to individual litigants cannot be a significant 
factor in granting certiorari. The Court is simply "too busy" to right individual wrongs. 
No matter how unjustly a petitioner has been served by the courts below, the Supreme 
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Court takes the attitude that the petitioner at least has had the benefit of judicial review, 
and therefore the Supreme Court cannot waste its time granting one more review process. 
The Court instead must husband its scarce resources to benefit society as a whole. 
 
 Having abandoned any sense of judicial duty toward individual litigants, the 
"facts" of a case before the Supreme Court become supremely unimportant. The Court 
does not have time to review the facts in any depth. Although a careful examination of 
the facts would be essential to any court that wanted to render justice between the parties, 
the Supreme Court's lack of interest in the facts of a case goes hand in hand with its 
unwillingness to waste its time righting individual injustices. 
 
 To be sure, there are occasional Supreme Court opinions that delve deeply into 
the facts of a case. But on close reading, these will be seen as attempts by the writer of 
the particular opinion to categorize the case as one that should be "confined to its facts." 
Of course, if the case was truly to be confined to its facts, then certiorari would never 
have been granted; considering such a case would truly be an inefficient use of the 
Court's resources. Instead, "confining a case to its facts" is simply a ploy to limit [p117] 
the scope of the Court's legislative pronouncement emanating from the case at hand. Or, 
more exactly, it is a ploy to undercut the authoritativeness of the legislative 
pronouncements of the Justices who disagree with the opinion-writer and hold instead 
that the case should not be confined to its facts.FN9 
 
 Having become institutionally disengaged from doing justice to the litigants based 
on the facts of a case, the Supreme Court has become a legislative body that derives its 
apparent authority from the mere appearance of deciding particular cases. I think that 
each Justice is acutely aware of all of this, even though it is of course a forbidden subject 
for public acknowledgement. For a Justice to admit that the facts of a case and the rights 
of the parties are unimportant would undermine the public's confidence in the Court, 
because the public still regards it as a "court" and not a legislature. If nevertheless the 
public eventually catches on to what the Court is actually doing, public opinion may 
force a reduction toward the rather limited adjudicatory role envisaged by the framers. 
 
 Simply put, what counts today is not what the Justices do but rather what they 
say. They do not themselves care very much about what they do to the actual litigants 
before them; individual justice has become irrelevant. FN10 But what they say has broad 
legislative consequences. They can either expand or reduce Title Seven; they can expand 
or reduce at will the Sherman and Clayton Acts; they can "interpret" what Congress says 
any way they like; and on occasion they declare statutes unconstitutional. FN11 A "case" 
is simply a convenient vehicle to justify this kind of errant social legislation. The Court's 
power FN12 and public acceptability is very much a shrewd product of labelling its 
legislative enactments "decisions." FN13 
 
 Given the reality of the Supreme Court's new institutional role as a legislator 
rather than an adjudicator, it follows that individual Justices will use a panoply of 
individual opinions, concurrences, and dissents, to publicize their own legislative 
preferences. Given the further reality that what counts today is not what the Court does 
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but rather what it says, it follows that individual Justices will try to say as much as 
possible.FN14 The proliferation of individual opinions is a function of nine legislators in 
black robes competing for legislative attention. It has nothing to do with changing 
anyone's opinion as to the merits of the litigants' positions in any given case. 
 
 In brief, deconstruction has already happened on the Supreme Court—and with a 
vengeance! Not only can no member of the Court really believe that "the law" (self-
invented by the very Court it is supposed to govern!) can constrain the result in any 
individual case, but its members have also convinced themselves that they have no time 
to be concerned with dispensing justice to the parties. The justificatory legal language 
used in judicial opinions is not what our law teachers told us it was. The justificatory 
legal language is not provided to explain—much less constrain—the result in the case. 
Rather, it is a mode of couching the personal legislative preferences of unelected judges 
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FN3 Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 286 (1989)  
 
FN4 Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of 
Institutional Values, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 200, 204 (1984) (all federal courts for the year 
ending June 30, 1983); Rubin, Doctrine in Decision-Making: Rationale or 
Rationalization, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 357, 367 (Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals from 1981 
to 1985). 
 
FN5 Kress, supra note 3, at 324. 
 
FN 6 Id.  A standard objection to the statistic is that overworked federal judges have little 
time to write dissents; the magnitude of litigation, and not determinacy, produces the low 
dissent rate. Although crowded dockets probably push the rate of dissent downward, the 
rate probably remains low enough to warrant additional explanation. 
 
FN7 Benson, How Judges Fool Themselves: The Semiotics of the Easy Case, in 2 LAW 




FN8 I suspect that Supreme Court clerks inform the Justices of the "issues" in certiorari 
petitions, and the Justices initially vote on what "issues" they would like to deal with. 
Only if the certiorari battle within the Court becomes heated will the Justices look beyond 
the "Issues Presented" part of the cert. petitions to the circumstances of the case. 
 
FN9 More precisely still, a fact-laden opinion may reflect a move toward minimum law-
making acceptability among the Justices signing it. 
 
FN10 Is there any other way to account for the way the Court treated the various 
petitioners in the Miranda decision? (It picked a handful of defendants out of some 70 
applicants, and made the new Miranda rule applicable to them; the others were 
unceremoniously thrown back into prison.) 
 
FN11 But a deconstructionist would argue that it is never necessary for the Supreme 
Court to declare a statute unconstitutional. The "interpreting" process can eviscerate any 
statute. Indeed, as I argued in 1978, the finding in Brown v. Board of Education that 
"separate but equal" was unconstitutional was not only unnecessary, but actually set back 
the civil rights movement by at least an entire generation. See S. WASBY, A. D'AMATO & 
R. METRAILER, DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER: AN EXPLORATION OF 
SUPREME COURT STRATEGIES (1978). 
 
FN12 Nor is this power illusory even though it relies on the language of judicial opinions. 
The indeterminacy thesis does not say that language does not affect human behavior; it 
only holds that the language of the law does not point with certainty to a decision for one 
party rather than another in any given case. The words of a statute indeed affect aggregate 
social behavior. Ninety percent of the public may change their conduct as the result of a 
statute (but we cannot tell in advance which individuals will fall into the 90%)! There is 
no doubt that Supreme Court decisions will affect aggregate social behavior. But when 
this is done at the expense of caring about justice to the individual litigants, it is worse 
than parasitical upon the adjudicatory role of the Court—it is a usurpation of a role 
constitutionally delegated to elected legislators. 
 
FN13 The shrewdness may be more institutional than individual. I am not sure that 
individual Justices have consciously intended the Court to become a legislative body. 
Rather, this result seems to have been produced by institutional evolution. Caseload 
pressures have eroded the original and appellate dockets, and the huge competition for 
certiorari slots has forced the Justices to abandon concern for doing justice to the parties. 
As a result, perhaps by default, the judges have turned into legislators. Unfortunately, the 
new visibility of their role—played up by the media—has made the Court better known 
and better accepted by the public than ever before in its history. This new sense of power 
then reinforces the legislative tendencies that I have suggested, and each new Justice 
learns that legislation is what the Supreme Court is all about. 
 
FN14 The extended essays of Justice Fortas, during his brief stay on the Court, appeared 
at the time to me (as a teacher of Constitutional Law) as an aberration. I remember telling 
my students that Justice Fortas mistakenly used a case as a vehicle—sometimes even a 
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loosely-fitting vehicle—for writing his own philosophy into the public record. What I 
was unaware of was that the Fortas approach was then only an exaggeration of what the 
other Justices were doing. From today's perspective, the opinions of Justice Fortas have a 
very "modern" ring! The Supreme Court Justice of today is a philosopher with a roving 
commission. 
 
FN15 Northwestern's Law Review editors, looking over this Article, have asked me 
whether I am opposed to judicial activism for ideological or political reasons. Actually, I 
rather like a great deal of the Court's social legislation. On freedom of speech, in 
particular, the Court has led and educated the country. I have the simple faith that if the 
Court were driven primarily by a desire to ensure that justice is done to the parties, the 
quality of its decisions would improve. Many of those decisions will anyway have broad 
social ramifications. But I think the societal impact of a decision should be its byproduct 
rather than constituting the reason for making the decision. 
 
